



Committee B of the National Parliament Holds Hearings for the Proposed 2015 State General Budget for the Security Sector

Mahein's Voice No. 90, 06 November 2014



This Report of Fundasaun Mahein's Voice is supported by the People of America through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Embassy of Finland in Jakarta.

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Introduction

The government presented the proposed of the 2015 State General Budget (SGB) to the National Parliament (NP) on October 2014, and this draft of the budget is currently being heard by the many parliamentary committees. The security-related aspects of this budget proposal were heard before Parliamentary Committee B from November 10-14, 2014.¹

Committee B has urged Fundasaun Mahein (FM) to analyze Law No. 16/III (3^a) of the proposed 2015 SGB and to offer its opinions regarding the proposed budget.² As such, this report serves as FM's hearing of the proposed measures.

This report will focus primarily on budget allocations for security institutions, such as the Ministry of Defense and Security (MDS), the National Defense Institute (NDI), FALINTIL-Defence Force of Timor-Leste, the National Police of Timor Leste (PNTL), the National Intelligence Service (NIS) and Committee B of National Parliament.

In the following commentary, FM will analyze the annual action plan and the proposed allocations for security essentials. The current shortage of these basic materials and equipment has become a national concern, for citizens and government officials alike. In order to promote the capacity of the security institution, the keys areas of legislation, infrastructure, equipment, and operations must be prioritized in 2015.

Methodology

This commentary of the proposed 2015 SGB focuses on the security-related elements. In particular, the report will discuss the annual action plan and the allocations proposed for the MDS, Committee B, and the NIS. FM's monitoring for this report focused on the development of the various security institutions.

¹ The National Parliament Committee B – Foreign Affairs, Defense and National Security. Calendar of the debating session for the proposed State General Budget for 2015.

² Invitation from the National Parliament, urging Fundasaun Mahein to hear the proposed 2015 SGB, as it pertains to the security sector of Timor-Leste. This invitation was issued on 27 October 2014.




To prepare for this report, FM conducted a Security Sector Discussion (SSD), during which FM researchers discussed issues of defense and security, such as border security, maritime security, migratory control, community safety, and intelligence.

Therefore, this report will focus on these aforementioned essential areas, as FM has classified them as ‘weak’ elements of Timor-Leste’s internal and external security policy.

The SGB for the Ministry of Defense and Security (MDS)

Of the proposed US\$1.5 billion SGB, US\$71.348million has been allocated to the Ministry of Defense and Security (MDS). This total does not include special funds and funding for development partners. The proposed MDS budget, separated by expense category, can be found below.


The 2015 MDS Budget, by Category (\$'000)



Source: Paper 4A of the proposed 2015 SGB

In addition, the departmental budgets have been calculated. The allocations for the cabinet of MDS, the Secretary of State for Defense (SSD), FALINTIL-F-FDTL, IDN, the Secretary of State for Security (SSS), and the PNTL are as follows:

Allocation Graphic for Institutions of the MDS (\$'000)



Source: Paper 4A of the proposed 2015 SGB

As mentioned above, this report will specifically discuss the essential areas of security, such as border security, maritime security, migratory control and the community safety. FM believes that these essential areas currently lack human resources, facilities, and equipment. There is also limited cooperation and coordination between related institutions. These gaps will leave Timor-Leste vulnerable to illegal activity, drug trafficking, weapons trafficking, human trafficking, falsification of official documents, and even global terrorist threats, which are currently evident in the region.

1. Defense and FALINTIL-FDTL

In 2015, the Defense and F-FDTL areas will create regulations and legislations for the Maritime Authority System of Timor-Leste and general defense defense area.³ FM has recommended in previous reports that the relevant authorities create a maritime authority system that coordinates the efforts of the Naval Component, FALINTIL-F-FDTL, MPU, Department of Taxes, Quarantine, Port Authority, and the National Directorate of Fisheries. This coordination should occur at a Center of National Maritime Security, whose responsibilities would include drafting legislation and initiatives for the maritime authority system.

FM's monitoring has noted that coordination is not demanded or prioritized by any authority's official responsibilities. Coordination only occurs between informal contacts in the event of an accident or incident at sea.

³ Paper 2 of the 2015 SGB. Annual Plan Action for FALINTIL-FDTL. Page 129



Superior officers of the F-FDTL and the PNTL have also expressed concern regarding the poor inter-agency coordination. Brigadier General Filomeno Paixão said that a functional system of coordination has not yet been established. This will present consequences to the control systems of the F-FDTL, PNTL, taxes, ministry of transport, and communication at the borders. This control system operates fully on the northern coast but not on the southern coast.

Meanwhile, the Commander of the Maritime Police Unit (MPU), Lino Saldanha, expressed his approval of the Maritime Authority System, because it places more priority on integrated service. The General Director of the Maritime Authority has been granted the political clearance to draft and pass institutional legislation for maritime authorities.

This maritime authority system will combine relevant institutions to create a unit focused on maritime control, port inspection, import/export procedures, and the operation of both small and large naval vessels within the exclusive economic zone of Timor-Leste. The maritime authority deals with the sovereignty of Timor-Leste. State control systems for land have been established, but Timor-Leste's borders at sea and in the air have not yet been clearly monitored. Therefore, the state should create this monitoring through a collaborative system such as the Maritime Authority System. The F-FDTL, PNTL, Department of Taxes, Ministry of Transport, and Ministry of Communication currently devote attention to northern coast, but such oversight is still lacking along the southern coast.⁴

The defense sector will support many activities, such as developing the relations between institutions involved in border security, a task that involves establishing internal cooperation between FALINTIL-F-FDTL and PNTL.⁵ The activity plan that has been set out for the year 2015 places particular emphasis on border management. FM suggests that the relevant authorities perform a joint evaluation of evolving threats to border security, so that personnel at the borders can design an integrated, co-departmental plan of response.

⁴ SSD-F-FDTL PRESENTS THE PATTERN OF THE MARITIME AUTHORITY, 2020. Available at: <http://jornal.suara-timor-lorosae.com/sed-f-fdtl-apresenta-modelu-autoridade-maritima-2020/>. Accessed on 05 November 2014

⁵ Paper 2 of the 2015 SGB. Annual Plan of Action for FALINTIL-FDTL. Page 135



However, current human resource limitations at the integrated posts along the border will challenge the efficacy of these institutions. Members of the BPU are concerned about the lack of human resources, particularly at the border territory. Without these resources, they are not able to patrol these areas. As a result of these known limitations, foreigners have smuggled illegal goods and even people over these vulnerable borders. In light of these activities, as well as those associated with border pass violations, FM recommends the fortification of resources and greater cooperation at these integrated border posts.

In commending on the cooperation between the F-FDTL and the PNTL in maritime security operations,⁶ FM noted that this cooperation was going well so far, but these efforts suffer from a lack of support facilities. Therefore, FM recommends that the SSD and SSS establish infrastructure for the naval component of the F-FDTL and the Maritime Police Unit of PNTL in South and West coasts. Illegal fishing activities continue to steal fish from the sea, despite Timor-Leste's stated prioritization of maritime regulation and security.

Ideally, there would be a fortification of infrastructure and equipment, such as maintenance for naval vessels and units of the F-FDTL (7 navies and 2 LAR).⁷ FM has alerted the dire need for this. However, Timor-Leste does not have the necessary equipment for such maintenance. The proposed 2015 SGB, fortunately, has included a revised rubric for the maintenance of F-FDTL naval units. FM has discovered that many of these ships do not yet operate, because they have not yet received the appropriate maintenance.

Another issue relates to the service of the National Defense Institute (NDI), whose mission is to develop national defense strategy through research, scientific investigation, and discourse relating to national defense and security. This institute also discusses training and curriculum for the army and other security personnel.⁸

FM recommends that the NDI publish the findings of its research and scientific investigations, in order to provide strategic recommendations for state decision-makers. It has become clear that regional and global security developments will have implications for national stability, and these must be taken into account.

⁶ Paper 2 of the 2015 SGB. Annual Plan of Action for FALINTIL-FDTL. Page 135

⁷ Paper 2 of the 2015 SGB. Annual Plan of Action for FALINTIL-FDTL. Page 136

⁸ Paper 2, of 2015 SGB. Annual Action Plan for the National Defense Institute (NDI). Page 139



According to FM's monitoring, the NDI has been operating for four years but has not yet produced a single report or scientific investigation relating to national defense and security matters. From the NDI portal, FM learned that the core activities of the NDI so far have been trips abroad, training sessions, seminars, and discussions.⁹

2. Internal Security and PNTL

a. Migration Control

In 2015, the migratory control system will develop the capacity of Migration Services and will effectively implement the strategies of the Migration Services in border posts, territorial delegation, permanent services, and administrative processes relating to the circulation of people and goods across the borders at land, sea, and air. FM has discovered that the current control system is still insufficient in all of the territories of Timor-Leste. In fact, Migration Services has not yet calculated the number of foreign people residing in Timor-Leste as well as those here for temporary activities. The Migration Services Department has not yet established a data base to categorize these foreign residents by nationality, length of stay, purpose of stay, etc.

In 2013, a national media report stated that Migration Services captured some foreign people who were staying illegally in Timor-Leste and used tourist visas while working. In total, the apprehended suspects numbered around 790. From this number, Migration Services has deported 217. Many of the remaining detainees are fulfilling state-sanctioned labor to repay debts, and 393 undergo processing for working visas. More than 600 of these visa violators are from Indonesia, 74 from China, 8 from the Philippines, one or two from Singapore, 35 from Myanmar, 35 from Vietnam, and 2 from Sri Lanka. These people have been deported back voluntarily.¹⁰ Unfortunately, Timor-Leste does not have sufficient budget for deporting. FM believes that this presents a big challenge to Timor-Leste's migratory control, and people may continue violating legal migration procedures.

⁹ Website of the National Defense Institute (NDI): www.idn.tl

¹⁰ Violating Visas: Immigration Services captures 790 foreign people. Available at: <http://suara-timor-lorosae.com/viola-vistu-imigrasaun-kaer-ema-rai-liur-790/>. Accessed on 05 November 2014.



In mid-2014, all media outlets reported that Migration Services had captured those foreign people using working visas as well as tourists. Collaborating with SEFPOPE, the immigration police launched a task force in Lautem, Viqueque, Baucau and Manatuto. Through cooperation they captured 63 foreigners from China, the Philippines, Indonesia, Portugal, and Vietnam. These detainees have processed been processed according to immigration law, and some others were processed administratively. As civil repayment, these people have since created construction companies that provide services to the government and community.¹¹

This department will keep controlling and monitoring foreign people in all national territories,¹² and it will continue to control and prevent border crimes, such as human trafficking and falsification of documents. This department will also supervise the visa usage of foreign people in this nation. FM has discovered a troubling reality: falsified documents are increasingly circulated, and many are used by foreigners in this country.

On 26 September 2014, security authorities of Timor-Leste captured Timorese and foreign individuals in Dili in possession of equipment used in the production of false documents, such as computer and other machines. These groups have counterfeited official state documents since 2002, and the profit of these activities has ranged from US\$100.00 to 500.00 per day. The falsified documents include baptism certificates, RDTL certificates, driver's licenses, vehicle registrations (STNK), vehicle inspection documents, school diplomas, electoral cards, and other official documents.

These false documents have been of state concern since the general election of 2007, in which these electoral cards were used by at least 600 foreigners. In another incident, a Korean man used a Timor-Leste passport. This man was captured by the Indonesian security authorities upon arrival in Indonesia with a false passport. Another similar case involved an Indonesian citizen ('ARD') who

¹¹ The Immigration Police has Captured 63 Foreigners who have violated visa terms. Available at: <http://noticias.sapo.tl/tetum/info/artigo/1413487.html>. Accessed on 05 November 2014

¹² Paper 2 of OJE 2015. Annual Action Plan for the Secretary of State for Security. Page 147



falsified his identity in order to obtain a passport, an electoral card, and an RDTL certificate from Motael village, under the initials 'RMS.'¹³

b. Criminal Investigation

The criminal investigation sector will develop technical and professional capacity of PNTL members through internal training in specific areas, such as basic and advanced investigation training for addressing issues of drugs, organized crime, money laundering, and human trafficking.¹⁴ For external training, this sector will provide scholarships for 10 personnel to obtain specialties in forensics, criminology, pathology, and psychology areas. With these professional skills, the chosen personnel will manage the police service efficiently and effectively.¹⁵

Criminal activity, particularly organized crime, is difficult for the PNTL to detect, because the PNTL still lacks basic human resources in this area. The Secretary State for Security, Fransisco Guterres, explained:

*“As I have always said, the PNTL, in terms of resources to address organized crime, is still lacking. This limitation is recognized by the state and government that we have. We are steadily trying to improve it”.*¹⁶

The PNTL's criminal investigation service continues to face severe limitations, especially in some specific areas. It must focus on increasing the knowledge of its investigators, because today's crimes are becoming more complicated and more organized. Therefore, there is a growing need for qualified investigators for effective and efficient service.

Interestingly enough, the departments handling criminal investigation have doubled. In May 2014, Timor-Leste passed the Decree Law No. 15/2014, which created the Scientific Police Criminal Investigation (SPCI) unit. In a report in

¹³ Gaps in Timor-Leste's Security: Attractive for Organized Crime. Mahein Nia Lian No. 87, 30 September 2014. Available at: http://www.fundasaunmahein.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/MNL_Nu.-87_3009201_Operasaun-Krime-pdf.pdf. Accessed on 05 November 2014

¹⁴ Paper 2 of the 2015 SGB. Annual Plan of Action for PNTL. Page 152

¹⁵ Paper 2 of the 2015 SGB. Annual Plan of Action for FALINTIL-FDTL. Page 153

¹⁶ The PNTL lacks human resources to detect organized crime. Available at: <http://www.thediliweekly.com/news/news/1930-pntl-unarmed-in-the-fight-against-organised-crime>. Accessed on 05 November 2014.



September 2014, FM speculated that this service would not motivate criminal investigators and could create competition amongst departments, because the competencies attributed to the SPCI are almost identical to those assigned to the CIS-PNTL. The decree law states that the SPCI will only focus on the complex and organized cases, but the distinction has not been clearly made. FM views that the investment for investigative processes will not be concentrated and will only increase the state's expenses. This will occur because many institutions are fulfilling the same duties.¹⁷ This year, the SPCI has been budgeted US\$1.089million.¹⁸

c. Security of Land Borders

The internal training will also focus on public order. As such, there will be training for 60 new police officials.¹⁹ In 2015, there will also be the purchase of Loire arms, pistols, bullets, and armaments for the BPU. With these resources, there will hopefully be sufficient safeguards against internal threats at the border territory.²⁰ There will also be an acquisition of radios, binoculars, lamps, batteries, and recorders.²¹

FM has analyzed the proposed budget for the aforementioned activities, particularly in regards to equipments for the BPU. In mid-2014, FM conducted monitoring at the border area from Mota Ain (Bobonaro) to Mota Masin (Covalima), and from Sakato to Citrana (Oe-cusse). Members of BPU that were interviewed consistently reported that they were lacking radio communications, binoculars, lamps, and other sensitive equipments that has not functioned yet. This equipment has been demanded by the BPU members. Therefore, they ask the government to support the acquisition of equipment for use at the border territory.

Also, the lack of human resources at the border is troubling. Less than 10 members are present at each post, and the distance of between BPU posts

¹⁷ Creation Policy for the Scientific Police of the Criminal Investigation (SPCI) Partners and Threats for the Security Institution. Available at: http://www.fundasaunmaheun.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/MNL_Nu.86_25092014_PSIK.pdf. Accessed on 05 November 2014

¹⁸ Paper 4A, 2015 SGB. Rubric Budget for the Ministry of Justice. Page 2

¹⁹ Paper 2 of the 2015 SGB. Annual Action Plan for the PNTL. Page 153

²⁰ Paper 2 of the 2015 SGB. Annual Action Plan for the PNTL. Page 155

²¹ Paper 2 of the 2015 SGB. Annual Action Plan for the PNTL. Page 156



along the border is as much as 25 kilometers. These situations threaten BPU's patrol, as some people may carry out their illegal activities across the border undetected. These situations have become concerns for civil society members affiliated with security at the border. FM's recommendation is that the government must add more BPU posts to the border territory, in order to effectively monitor as much of the border as possible.

d. Maritime Security

In 2015, authorities will conduct the construction of 8 new posts for the Maritime Police Unit (MPU) in Com, Lore, Batugade, Oe-cusse, Suai Loro, Betano, Beaco and Carabela. They will also establish permanent posts, walls, and a swimming pool at Cional Dili. This department will also acquire vehicles, jetskies, and special buoys, all geared toward increasing patrol activities for southern coasts of Timor-Leste.²² External training will be offered to 40 individuals, who will receive scholarships to obtain licensing in captainship, mechanics, electrics, naval operations, brigadiership, and professional inspection.²³

The proposed budget addresses some of the problems thus far. The posts along the Northern coast as of now include the police post for MPU, composed of Batugade, Atabae, Atauro, Beloi, Port of Dili, Cional of Dili, and Com Lospalos. The proposed training measures are geared toward specializing MPU members in navigation, mechanics, and operations.

On the other hand, to complete these upcoming posts in 2015, there must be an investment in human resources. Recently, there were 120 MPU personnel divided to three areas. These posts were located at the border, in ships, and at the unit's quarters. This has been the trend since the MPU was established with 8 PNTL members in 2001 by the United Nation Police. In 2010, membership of the MPU increased to 44, and this figure reached 120 in 2014.²⁴

²² Paper 2 of the 2015 SGB. Annual Action Plan for the PNTL. Page 155

²³ Paper 2 of the 2015 SGB. Annual Action Plan for the PNTL. Page 153

²⁴ PM XANANA INAUGURATES THE MARITIME POLICE POST BUT NEEDS THE CONTRIBUTION OF ENTREPRENEURS. Available at: <http://jornal.suara-timor-lorosae.com/pm-xanana-inagura-postu-polisia-maritima-presija-kontribusaun-emprezariu/>. Accessed on 05 November 2014.



e. Community Safety

According to the PNTL's annual plan for community police in the proposed 2015 SGB, the PNTL will develop the technical and professional capacity of its members through internal training. In community policing activities, the PNTL will continue training village police officers (VPO) in villages, and it will also continue its basic training for community police. Also prioritized will be technical communication training for the VPOs in villages and youth volunteer guards of villages in 13 districts, so as to equip police members with profound understanding of social and psychological elements of field world. Training for youth volunteer guards will also provide support for police in the areas of security and crime prevention.²⁵

In 2015, the infrastructural development of the PNTL will occur through construction, rehabilitation of residences, road building, and other installation. The PNTL institution will construct 38 police posts in 13 districts. Something that the PNTL wishes to achieve within 2015 is to establish a greater police presence in rural areas, in order to better protect the people.²⁶

In 2015, the PNTI will ameliorate administration and operations through the acquisition for security equipment and motorbikes for 13 districts commanders in 13 districts. This acquisition takes place in response to the concern that police personnel do not currently possess enough transport to support their services.²⁷ But it is not yet clear how many motorbikes have been allocated to district commanders, for the community police, and for other departments. FM recommends that these vehicles are allocated for the community policing initiatives. FM's monitoring has gathered that VPOs in villages face large challenges in transport. For example, a VPO who works in two or three villages but lives in another village lacks transport. Sometimes, this VPO officer uses public transport and private motorbike for work, because there are no residences for the VPOs in villages.

In 2015, there will be increased visibility of police personnel, who will patrol areas by car, motorbike, and foot. This measure will further involve communities in

²⁵ Paper 2 of the 2015 SGB. Annual Action Plan for the PNTL. Page 152

²⁶ Paper 2 of the 2015 SGB. Annual Action Plan for the PNTL. Page 154

²⁷ Paper 2 of the 2015 SGB. Annual Action Plan for the PNTL. Page 155



police services, and the police will consequently be able to respond to accidents and incidents. This will designate the VPOs as the official security liaisons in villages. These VPOs will hold community meetings with the local leaders, businessmen, youth, NGOs, and churches. The purpose of these measures is to motivate police to visit schools, villages, and hamlets, in hopes of gathering demographic data. The collective result of these changes in 2015 will be greater peace and trust between the police and the communities. As such, we will hopefully witness a greater confidence in police as responders to crime, accidents, and incidents at the community level.²⁸

FM believes that these measures are aligned with the PNTL Strategic Plan for community police, even though some basic necessities of community police in the field, such as residence, remain unaddressed. FM believes this allocation will be approved by the National Parliament, because the National Parliament has taken note of the conditions of community police and demanded that the government pay attention to police conditions. The NP has also noted the public desire for greater professionalism within police forces. This allocation realizes the codependency of these two areas: to provide professional service, the police must have good conditions (facilities, equipment, human resources, etc.).

Community concerns about police presence are receiving strong attention by the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister. These two leaders have requested the presence of VPOs in all villages across the 13 districts. The orientation for PNTL District Commanders instructs them to place VPOs in all villages in their districts. By mid-2015, VPOs should exist in 442 villages.²⁹

At the end of 2013, FM published a report outlining the basic initiatives of community police.³⁰ This initiative was realized with the help of development partners and donors,³¹ who helped create the Council of Community Police

²⁸ Paper 2 of the 2015 SGB. Annual Action Plan for the PNTL. Page 156

²⁹ Speeches of Chief of the National Community Police Department, Superintendent Assistant Boavida Ribeiro, in the seminar of national community police in Dili, September 2014.

³⁰ Initiatives of the Community Police Practice: Initiatives of District Commanders of Bobonaro, Aileu, Liquisa, and the Maritime Police Unit. Available at: http://www.fundasaunmahein.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/MNH_Nu.05_15112013_Polisia-Komunitariapdf.pdf. Accessed on 24 October 2014.

³¹ The donors who have provided support for community policing thus far are the government of New Zealand, thanks to its Timor-Leste Community Policing Program (TLCPP), The Asia Foundation's HAKOHAK Program, and the Japanese government, via its JICA program.



(CCP) and Security Volunteer (VS) corps for villages. The CCP and VS have formed branches in 8 districts, including Aileu, Ainaro, Baucau, Bobonaro, Dili, Liquica, Manatuto, and Viqueque. Covalima, Ermera, and Manufahi are currently in the socialization phase but will soon move forward in implementation. These resources will be implemented in 10 villages per district;³² these CCP and VS are currently functioning in 74 villages in 8 districts.³³

The CCP and VS are types of community police that involve all social strata of communities. These two teams are composed of VPOs, village chiefs, members of the village councils, story tellers, veterans, business representatives, educators, health workers, church leaders, and other relevant village actors.³⁴

The establishment of VPOs, CCPs, and VSs in villages is a concrete response to the PNTL Strategic Plan, where states the PNTL's commitment to the VIP Doctrine, which prioritizes policing that is Visible, Involved, and Professional. These new actions are greatly increasing the visibility of police in communities.

What are the objectives of VPOs, CCPs, and VS corps? The main activity of community police is prevention of conflict and crime. As the first step in this prevention, the CCP and VS should identify the security issues in their villages. After identifying these issues, they will analyze these issues, in terms of priority and frequency. Afterwards, these groups collaborate to find solutions for the identified problems. The standard methods of resolving conflict are mediation and traditional justice with the story tellers of their village. To illustrate: There is an ongoing land dispute between people in all territories of Timor-Leste. During the last couple years, the number of criminal cases associated with this dispute has continued to increase. The VPO, CCP and VS act as mediators between the many stakeholders of this case. However, they will not intervene in the criminal aspects of this case but, instead, refer these matters to the police already existing in their village.

The VPOs, CCPs, and VS personnel will also make visits to homes and schools, where they will share important security information with students and families.

³² Speeches of the Chief of the National Community Police Department, Superintendent Assistant Boavida Ribeiro, in the seminar of national community police in Dili, September 2014.

³³ The National Department of Community Police, 2014.

³⁴ Ribeiro, Boavida, the Assistant Superintendent (2014). Chief of the National Community Police Department. Private Interview



Apart from this, these groups are also involved in some tasks ordered by the government, such as socialization for the domestic violence. However, it must be noted that members of the CCP and VS are working voluntarily.

FM's monitoring in districts with established CCP and VS branches has found that conflict and crime have reduced significantly, when compared to rates from previous year. Community members are directly involved in the peacemaking and decision-making processes, and these measure have led to greater peace in their villages and hamlets. These new institutions are a response to the PNTL Strategic Plan for 2014-2018, and they seem to coincide with the VIP Doctrine. Communities become principal agents in the security sector and have taken ownership of local development.

These successes have not yet received massive attention from the government. This seems to be evident from the budget allocation for community police in the upcoming year. Community police activities in districts and villages currently face several limitations in areas such as facilities, equipment, and training for community police personnel.³⁵

In mid-2014, the PNTL General Commander and a few donor organizations met in Dili to discuss community policing matters. During this meeting, an evaluation team, made up of donors that have supported community police, presented a preliminary report stating that community police in all villages face basic problems in facilities, equipment, and adequated training for community police members.³⁶

FM also conducted monitoring of community policing during workshops between police and community leaders in five districts from 2013-2014. FM attended workshops in Aileu, Covalima, Liquica, Oe-cusse, and Viqueque. Participants of

³⁵ Initiatives of the Community Police Practice: Initiatives of the District Commanders of Bobonaro, Aileu, Liquisa, and the Maritime Police Unit. Available at: http://www.fundasaunmahein.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/MNH_Nu.05_15112013_Polisia-Komunitariapdf.pdf. Accessed on 24 October 2014.

³⁶ Preliminary Monitoring and Evaluation by the Timor-Leste Community Policing Programme (TLCPP) and Strengthening the Cooperation with the Police and Communities (HAKOHAK). The evaluation team was made up of Gordon Peake, Bu Wilson no João Almeida. Fundasaun Mahein was also a participant in this preliminary report discussion. This preliminary report presentation was held on 2 September 2014 at the World Vision Hall, Bidau – Dili.



these workshops raised similar frustrations with transportation, communication, residence, and training for community police.


The government has taken note of community police issues, and some of these problems have been addressed in the proposed 2015 SGB. These measures can be found in the 2015 SGB Annual Action Plan, as it relates to the PNTL. This year, the PNTL will focus on human resource training, community policing, infrastructural development, facilities, and equipment.³⁷ These are aligned with the PNTL's philosophy as well as the PNTL Strategic Plan for 2014-2018, which have together prioritized the Visible, Involved, & Professional (VIP) Doctrine for community policing.

The budget dedicated to improving community policing is part of a movement to increase police professionalism in the field, which is a prime concern of both the National Parliament and citizens of the country.

The National Intelligence Service (NIS)

The proposed 2015 SGB allocates US\$2.288 million for the Prime Minister's office. The projected expenses, by category, are shown in the graphic below.

NIS Expenses by Budget Category (\$'000)



Source: Paper 4A the 2015 SGB Proposed

³⁷Paper 2 of the 2015 SGB. Annual Action Plan for the PNTL.. Page 153



This year's budget will support the NIS in securing the state's information system. This initiative will reinforce coordination between the NIS, relevant ministries, and other institutions through the exchange of information. The NIS will also create and lead a technical commission of ministers that meets each quarter to evaluate security threats.

In 2015, the NIS will reinforce the information service at the international, national, and regional levels. The NIS plans to establish regional centers for information services in Oe-cusse, Baucau, and Suai.³⁸ The NIS will then provide courses relating to research and analysis of internal and external security information. The NIS will also provide training and courses relating to tourism, counter-terrorism, drug prevention, prevention of human trafficking, immigration policy, informatics and telecommunication.³⁹

In 2015, the NIS will continue to develop bilateral and multilateral cooperation with Asian countries, the CPLP (Portugal and Brazil), the Middle East, Australia, and the United State of America (USA). With each of these partners, the NIS will sign memorandum of understanding to share and exchange vital intelligence information.⁴⁰

FM believes that the allocation for NIS activities in 2015 is reflects the situation facing Timor-Leste recently. The aforementioned training will increase the knowledge of NIS personnel and will develop the coordination internally, bilaterally and multilaterally.

Among the threats currently facing Timor-Leste are global terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, human trafficking, money laundering, mafia activities, illegal immigration, and falsification of state documents. FM believes that all of these types of crime have begun fortifying their networks and activities in Timor-Leste.

As reported by national media news recently, Timor-Leste has become a prime location for illegal drugs in transit from central Asia and Africa to Indonesia.

³⁸ Paper 2 of the 2015 SGB. Annual Action Plan for the NIS. Page 40

³⁹ Paper 2 of the 2015 SGB. Annual Action Plan for the PNTL. Page 41

⁴⁰ Paper 2 of the 2015 SGB. Annual Action Plan for the PNTL. Page 41



Another prominent issue is the increase in falsified documents in circulation, many of which are being used by foreigners. Groups operating in Timor-Leste are printing documents through private enterprises which have rented computers and other printing equipment. FM has discovered that some individuals are receiving falsified documents to conduct business and illegal operations.⁴¹ Among the falsified documents found by FM have been electoral cards and RDTL certificates that have been produced and readied for distributing. Some of the fake documents identified by FM have come from Indonesia and China.⁴²

FM worries that the organized crime syndicates will use these false documents to reside and conduct illegal activities in Timor-Leste.

This is also a general concern regarding criminal groups in Asia and even neighbouring countries, such as Indonesia and Australia. Recently, Australian security authorities shot and killed a young man believed to be a member of ISIS.⁴³ In addition, members of ISIS were identified in Belun of Indonesia,⁴⁴ which is not far away from Timor-Leste. A simple land border separates Timor-Leste and Indonesia, and this border territory is now a worrying hotbed of illegal activity.

Will any of the issues above influence the security policy of Timor-Leste? FM warns that the government should congregate to discuss and analyze the potential implications of these threats for Timor-Leste. These groups will prey on the poor security landscape of Timor-Leste. There is also potential for migrant terrorists, from organizations such as ISIS, to freely enter Timor-Leste and begin conducting the dangerous activities now occurring in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Australia. All neighboring countries must cooperate to reinforce borders in this new fight against terrorists.⁴⁵

⁴¹ Report of the state information service regarding the falsification of the official state documents by crime groups. Captured in Dili on 26 September 2014.

⁴² Report of the state information service regarding the falsification of the official state documents by crime groups. Captured in Dili on 26 September 2014.

⁴³ Militants of ISIS Killed in Australia. Available at: <http://www.dw.de/tersangka-militan-isis-ditembak-mati-di-australia/a-17949404>. FM Accessed on 29 September 2014.

⁴⁴ Polisi cegah penyebaran propaganda ISIS. Disponivel iha: http://www.bbc.co.uk/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2014/09/140919_isis. FM asesu iha loron 29 Setembre 2014.

⁴⁵ Gaps in Timor-Leste's Security: Attractive for Organized Crime. Mahein Nia Lian No. 87, 30 September 2014. Available at: <http://www.fundasunmahein.org/wp->



Timor-Leste is relatively weak in the protection of maritime and land borders, and this country could be a prime location for terrorist activity and hiding. These scenarios will not bode well for Timor-Leste.⁴⁶

Recommendations

1. Committee B of the National Parliament

- a. Committee B of the National Parliament should support, through policy and budget allocation, the essential security areas, including border control, criminal investigation, community safety, and intelligence in the forthcoming budget discussion.
- b. Committee B should supervise the execution of the SGB, from the planning to the procurement to the implementation of projects. Committee B received a budget allocation of \$73 million (from the total \$117 million) specifically for field visits.

2. Government

- a. Directors of the MDS should prepare procurement calendar as well as shopping calendar for projects and contracts in 2015, in order to avoid emergency single-source procurements.
- b. The MDS should follow the laws of procurement and rules of good practice during the execution of the 2015 SGB.

[content/uploads/2014/09/MNL_Nu.-87_3009201_Operasaun-Krime-pdf.pdf](http://www.fundasaunmahein.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/MNL_Nu.-87_3009201_Operasaun-Krime-pdf.pdf). Accessed on 05 November 2014

⁴⁶ Gaps in Timor-Leste's Security: Attractive for Organized Crime. Mahein Nia Lian No. 87, 30 September 2014. Available at: http://www.fundasaunmahein.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/MNL_Nu.-87_3009201_Operasaun-Krime-pdf.pdf. Accessed on 05 November 2014



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